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Within the framework of the broader ethicai discussion on end-of-IMe decision 
making in neonatology and the need to obtain more quantifiable data, we per­
formed a multicenter study in four Dutch neonatal intensive care units. All infants 
who died in these units in 1993 were included in the study. Aside from cases in 
which foregoing treatment was not under discussion, cases in which death 
appeared inevitable (A cases) and cases in which foregoing treatment because 
of extremely poor prognosis was the decisive factor (B cases) were distinguished. 
A total of 181 neonatal deaths occurred. Thirty-five infants died even after full 
continuation of treatment. In 98 A cases and 48 B cases, which together 
represented 81 % of all deaths, treatment was foregone either because the infants 
had no chance to survive or because of extremely poor prognoses. In these cases, 
the medical team ultimately achieved consensus of opinion, although in some 
instances several sessions were required. In three cases, the parents did not agree 
with the team advice. In one A case death appeared inevitable. In two B cases, 
the parents’ wish to continue treatment was followed. In a large majority of B 
cases, the decisions to forego treatment were based on the presence of severe 
cerebral damage. In A cases there was no real choice because death appeared 
inevitable. However, in B cases neonatologists were obliged to determine whether 
continuation of treatment was justifiable or if withdrawal of treatment in view of 
extremely poor prognoses was preferred. (J Pediatr 1996;129:661-6)
Many decisions in neonatal intensive care have life-or-death 
consequences. Aggressive interventions for and the in-
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creased survival of very premature, extremely low birth 
weight and seriously sick newborn infants have intensified 
the discussion about the ethics of such decisions.1 The liter-
See commentary, p. 627.
ature contains very little quantifiable data about how neona­
tologists deal with ethical dilemmas in daily practice. In 1973 
Duff and Campbell2 reported the withdrawal of life-sustain­
661
6 6 2 de Leeuw  et a i The Journal o f Pediatrics
November 1996
ing therapy in 43 (14%) of 299 infants who died in a neo­
natal unit. In .1982 Campbell3 reported in a similar study the 
withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy in 20% of the cases 
under review. Neonatologists in Hammersmith’s Hospital 
reported in 1986 that active treatment had been discontinued 
in 47 (30%) of the 158 cases of infant death under review.4 
Eg-Anderson5 reported the withholding of therapy in 6 of 62 
deceased infants younger than 29 weeks of gestation*
This review of decision making in four Dutch neonatal 
intensive uuits should be read in the broader context of 
end-of-life decision making (including assisted dying) in the 
Netherlands.6 The attention has primarily been on patients 
past the newborn stage. For more than two decades the dif­
ficult choices faced at the end of such patients’ lives have 
been vigorously discussed in medical, legal, political, and 
public settings. Decisions to withhold or withdraw intensive 
measures to sustain life and decisions to ensure optimal pain 
management are accepted as ethically and legally justifiable, 
even though the decisions may secondarily contribute to the 
hastening of a patient’s death. Decisions to end intentionally 
a patient’s life have not been removed from criminal clas­
sification under the penal code in the Netherlands. However, 
criteria (e.g., a competent and informed patient, who is in ir­
remediable pain and suffering, who repeatedly requests as­
sistance in ending life) and guidelines (e.g., proper consul­
tation and proper reporting to the authorities) have been es­
tablished and provide protection from prosecution for 
physicians who assist a patient’s dying.
Neonatologists frequently face end-of-life decisions. We 
conducted this review of decision making in neonatal inten­
sive care units to describe and, where necessary, to correct 
impressions about decisions now being made in cases 
involving critically ill newborn infants in the Netherlands. 
The article reports a multicenter study of end-of-life deci­
sions conducted in 1993 by four of the 10 Dutch neonatal 
intensive care units.
M ETH O D S
In 1993, 195,673 infants were bom alive in the Nether­
lands, Of these infants, 3780 (1.9%) were admitted to the 10 
Dutch level III neonatal intensive care units. Of the total ad­
missions, 1284 (34%) occurred at the four participating units 
in this study. This study focuses on all infants who died in 
1993 in these four units.
The infants were classified in six categories according to 
the report “Doen of Laten?” (“ To do or not to do?” ) of the 
Dutch Society of Paediatrics.7 The six categories and their 
designations are outlined as follows:
1. Cases in which intensive treatment was judged to be 
warranted and was continued until death 
2A. Cases in which intensive treatment was withheld be­
cause of the patient’s inability to survive
2B. Cases in which intensive treatment was withheld be­
cause the patient’s prognosis was judged to be 
extremely poor 
3A. Cases in which intensive treatment was witii drawn 
because of the patient’s inability to survive 
3B. Cases in which intensive treatment was withdrawn 
because the patient’s prognosis was judged to be ex­
tremely poor
4. Cases in which intentional and active termination of 
the patient’s life was involved 
Category 1 encloses infants for whom limitation of treat­
ment was seriously considered but ultimately rejected, and 
those infants who died unexpectedly while receiving max­
imal treatment and without prior discussion of limitation of 
treatment.
Judgments regarding prognosis in the 2A and 3A cases 
concerned strictly medical decisions and were characterized 
by the absence of any realistic chance for the infant’s 
survival. Discontinuation of treatment was suggested to par­
ents in 2A and 3A cases to prevent the continuation of use­
less suffering for their infants. In these cases, well-informed 
parents usually agreed with team decisions to forego treat­
ment. If the parents did not agree, treatment was continued. 
Further discussions usually resulted in agreement between 
parents and the medical team.
Decisions in the 2B and 3B cases included additional eth­
ical considerations, The burden of the treatment and the pain 
and suffering borne by the patient were weighed against the 
anticipated prognosis for later life. In these cases, all exam­
inations necessary to establish the correct diagnosis and 
prognosis were performed. Once a diagnosis and prognosis 
had been made, the medical team sought a consensus as to 
what course of action to recommend. The judgment about a 
patient’s prognosis was based on the clinical experience of 
the medical team members and on guidance from the liter­
ature. Careful records were kept about team consultations— 
the individual who initiated the consultation, the actual de­
cision, the justification for and the process of the decision 
making, and at what time the decision was reached.
In most cases (except for category 1 cases), at least one 
formal team meeting was held in which the patient’s history 
was discussed by members of the medical staff, by residents, 
and by nurses. When appropriate, other professionals (e.g., 
obstetricians, consulting specialists, social workers) partic­
ipated in these deliberations. In most cases, more than one 
team meeting was held. It should be noted that in the Neth­
erlands it is not the team as a whole, but the attending neo- 
natologist, who is ultimately responsible for these decisions.
Once the medical team agreed on a decision, the decision 
was discussed elaborately and often on several occasions 
with the parents. Some parents had firm views about the best 
course of action, views they sometimes had earlier commu-
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Table I. Clinical data of study group compared with total 
group of admitted infants in the four participating units
Study group All admissions
No. % No. %
Gestational age (wk)
<28 36 19.9 121 9.4
28-31 53 29.3 410 32.0
32-36 30 16.6 376 29.3
S37 62 34.3 377 29.3
Birth weight (gm)
<1000 49 27.1 177 13.9
1000-1500 40 22.1 286 22.3
1500-2500 38 21.0 389 30.3
2=2500 54 29.8 432 33.6
Table II. Classification and treatment decisions
No. %
Treatment continued
Category 1 35 19.3
Treatment withheld
Category 2A 10 5.5
Categoiy 2B 5 2.8
Treatment withdrawn
Category 3 A 88 48.6
Category 3B 43 2 M
TOTAL 181 100
A cases: infants with no chance of survival; B cases: infants with poor prog­
noses.
nicated to members of the medical team. Parents who did not 
have such views usually allowed the medical team to make 
the decisions.
RESULTS
This study is based on 181 neonatal cases. Gestational 
ages and birth weights for the study patients and for the total 
number of patients admitted at the four sites are reported in 
Table I. The lowest gestational age and birth weight groups 
were overrepresented in the study group. Table II lists the 
classification and treatment choices of the study cases. No 
cases involving the intentional and active termination of the 
patient’s life (category 4 cases) occurred in this population.
Category 1 cases (intensive treatment judged to be 
warranted and continued until death), A total of 35 infants 
were included in this category. In these cases, continuation 
of treatment was considered the best choice, or infants died 
unexpectedly without discussion of limitation of treatment. 
Diagnoses included perinatal asphyxia (8), idiopathic respi­
ratory distress syndrome with complications (11), septicemia 
(2), serious congenital malformations (8), preterm infants 
with extreme growth retardation (2), and miscellaneous (4).
Table III. Results of team discussions
A cases B cases
Withholding treatment 10 5
Limited continuation 33 9
of treatment
Withdrawing treatment 55 M
TOTAL 98 48
A  cases: infants with no chance o f  survival; B cases: infants with poor prog­
noses.
Table IV. Comparison of 1990 study versus 1993 study
1990 study 1993 study
< 185 cases) <181 cases)
No. % NO. %
Category 1 74 40 35 19
Category 2A 17 9 10
Category 2B 5 3
Category 3A 58 31 88 49
Category 3B 35 19 43 24
Category 4 1 1
Category 2A cases (intensive treatment withheld be­
cause of the patient’s inability to survive). Ten infants 
were included in this group. Diagnoses included gestational 
age less than 26 weeks with intrauterine infection (3) and 
severe congenital malformations (7).
Category 3A cases (intensive treatment withdrawn 
because of the patient’s inability to survive). This group 
included 88 infants. Diagnoses included gestational age less 
than 26 weeks with severe complications (8), respiratory 
distress syndrome with complications (27), septicemia (12), 
perinatal asphyxia (7), severe congenital malformations 
(26), and miscellaneous (8).
Category 2B cases (intensive treatment withheld be­
cause the patient’s prognosis was judged to be extremely 
poor). Five infants were included in this category. Diagnoses 
were encephalopathy after perinatal asphyxia (1), severe ce­
rebral parenchymal bleeding (1), and severe congenital mal­
formations (3).
Category 313 cases (intensive treatment withdrawn 
because the patient’s prognosis was judged to be ex­
tremely poor). This group included 43 infants. Diagnoses 
included encephalopathy after perinatal asphyxia (21), se­
vere cerebral parenchymal bleeding (10), severe/multiple 
congenital malformations (7), and miscellaneous (5).
Team discussion about these treatment decisions was 
usually initiated by the treating neonatologist. In a few cases, 
the discussion was initiated by a nurse or the parents. For­
mal team discussions were defined by the presence of at least 
two or more neonatologists of the medical staff. In addition,
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one or more residents and one or more nurses always par­
ticipated in the discussions. A social worker was present in 
six case discussions. In 19 cases, another consulting special­
ist participated. An obstetrician was present for discussions 
of two cases. In 81 of the 146 cases in which treatment was 
discussed <A\ of 98 A cases and 40 of 48 B cases), the med­
ical teams held formal discussions. In the other 65 cases (57 
A cases and 8 B cases), informal discussions were routinely 
conducted.
Formal team discussions ultimately resulted in a consen­
sus in the study cases. However, several discussions were 
often necessary before this consensus was reached. The 
conclusions were discussed with the parents, either in the 
presence of a nurse involved in the care of the infant or of 
another professional involved in the case.
The conclusions of the team discussions are presented in 
Table III. As shown in the table, a limited continuation of 
treatment preceded the actual withdrawal of treatment in 33 
A and 9 B cases.
The time interval between the final conclusion of the 
medical team and the discussion with the parents was 1 hour 
or less in 71% of the cases, 1 to 6 hours in 24% of the cases, 
and more than 6 hours in 5% of the cases. The time interval 
between the final decision after the discussion with the par­
ents and the implementation of die decision was 1 hour or 
less in 64% of the cases, 1 to 6 hours in 30% of the cases, 
and more than 6 hours in 6% of the cases. Sixty-five percent 
of the infants died within 1 hour, 30% within 1 to 6 hours, 
and 5% after 6 hours. Of the 181 study infants who died, 34 
(19%) of the infants died in the first day of life, 96 (53%) 
of the infants died later in the first week of life, 27 (15%) of 
the infants died later in the first month, and 24 (13%) of the 
infants died after 1 month of life. Three of the 181 infants 
in the study group died after discharge from the intensive 
care unit.
Analgesics (opiates), sedatives, and anliepileptic drugs, 
either alone or in combination, were administered to 86 
(48%) of the infants (60% of the B cases). Although muscle 
relaxants were not generally used, 12 infants received a dose 
because of a very prolonged dying process.
In 89% of the cases, the parents were present when their 
infants died. Autopsies were performed in 46% of the cases. 
In 79% of the cases, the parents accepted invitations for an 
appraisal 6 to 8 weeks after the death of their infants.
D I S C U S S I O N
The neonatal units involved in this-study also conducted 
a study in 1990 of the 185 patient deaths in their units in that 
year.8 In that study, it was found that intensive care had not 
been started in 9% of the cases. In 31% of the cases inten­
sive care had been withdrawn because of the absence of a 
realistic chance of survival. In 19% of the cases intensive
care had been withdrawn because of extremely poor prog­
noses. In 40% of the cases, intensive treatment had been 
continued until die patient’s death.
When the results of these two studies are compared, some 
differences are evident (Table IV). In 1993 the number of A 
cases was comparatively higher in category 3 decisions (i.e., 
stopping treatment) and lower in categoiy 1 decisions (i.e., 
treatment continued until the patient’s death). It seems war­
ranted to conclude that a somewhat more liberal policy to­
ward discontinuation of intensive care treatment has been 
adopted during the intervening years.
In the 1993 study population, intentional and active 
termination of life did not occur. Under Dutch legislation, a 
doctor who performs intentional and active termination of 
life of a newborn infant must notify the public prosecutor. 
Whether this act actually will be regarded and judged 
according to the government’s Euthanasia Act was, until re­
cently, an open question. However, in 1995 there were two 
test cases about the active termination of life for newborn 
infants. Both patients had severe congenital malformations. 
In both cases, the acting doctor was found guilty of homi­
cide. However, in both cases the judge acquitted them 
because they were found to be in a 4 ‘conflict of duties.’ ’ They 
had the duty to cure the patient, but they also had to abolish 
the patient’s suffering and pain. Both judges considered the 
choice these doctors had made justified and considered their 
acting in accordance with the standards of carefulness, with 
the scientific medical understanding, and with the standards 
that apply in medical ethics. Appeal confirmed this judg­
ment in both cases.
Moreover, it currently is not clear whether Dutch legisla­
tion approves the withdrawal of treatment in very sick new­
born infants who could possibly survive with continued in­
tensive treatment, but who have extremely poor prognoses 
for the quality of later life. For neonatologists who follow the 
guidelines in the report “ Doen of Laten?” 7,9 foregoing life- 
sustaining intensive care is justifiable medical practice, not 
homicide. If death follows, these neonatologists consider it 
a natural death and they will not notify the legal authorities.
Some Dutch lawyers, however, hold the opinion that 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in view of the prog­
nosis for later life must be regarded as intentional and active 
termination of life and, accordingly, must be examined by 
the public prosecutor in accordance with criminal law. They 
argue that physicians do not have more knowledge of qual­
ity-of-1 if e criteria than other people, and therefore should not 
be allowed to base their decisions on these criteria.
Neonatal intensive care treatment is often very invasive, 
very extensive, and, in a way, very artificial. Intensive care 
itself may result in serious damage to the infant. On the other 
hand, without such treatment many infants would have had 
no chance of survival. If life-sustaining treatment turns into
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a futile act because the goal of giving the infant the prospect 
for a somewhat normal and healthy life without pain and 
suffering cannot be achieved, we are convinced that it should 
be permissible to stop the intervention. Such decisions are 
permitted in other fields of medicine.
To prevent inaccurate decision making in such cases, the 
Dutch Society of Paediatrics has advised that several neona- 
tologists participate in consultations about treatment with­
drawal decisions, at least in 2B and 3B cases. The absence 
of such consultations in eight B cases in the study popula­
tion, accordingly, is without defense and not in accordance 
with the Dutch report “ Doen of Laten?” 7
In our study, the conclusions drawn from the team discus­
sions ultimately were unanimous. Of course, this observation 
does not mean that differences of opinion did not exist. In 
many cases, a number of consultations were held before 
consensus was reached. Consultations were not separately 
recorded in every case.
Parents play an active role in the decision-making process. 
They are supposed to express their doubts, their feelings, and 
their agreement or disagreement with a doctor’s proposal, 
and their view will be taken into account by the doctors when 
making a final decision.
During the 1993 study there was a disagreement between 
the medical team and the parents about foregoing treatment 
in three cases, one À case and two B cases. In the A case, 
infant death followed. In the two B cases, infants with prog­
noses judged to be extremely poor, treatment was started/ 
continued and these infants survived. In both B cases, the 
parents’ wishes to continue treatment were followed, be­
cause in the Netherlands parental agreement is a prerequisite 
for foregoing intensive therapies. However, this prerequisite 
has the undesirable consequence that some infants may con­
tinue to suffer beyond humane limits. At follow-up both in­
fants were found to have severe developmental delay and 
cerebral palsy, and one had a severe visual handicap. These 
two surviving infants were not included in the 181 cases of 
infant death.
When the decision to forego treatment has been made, 
sufficient time should be allowed for parents to bid farewell 
to their infant. However, the recorded time intervals in the 
study cases suggest that, in many instances, the decision ap­
pears to have been implemented too quickly for this closure. 
We assume that this pace was influenced by the fact that, for 
most of these infants, the critical and often deteriorating condi­
tion was already present for some time and the parents in fact 
had made their fare wells before the ultimate decision was made.
In all B cases and in most A cases, parents were present 
when their infants died. Exceptions occurred only when the 
patient’s death could not be anticipated. Most of the parents 
returned for a later appraisal, suggesting that parents tend to 
be significantly involved in the dying process of their infants.
This involvement might be a reason for the disappointingly 
low percentage of autopsies reported in the study group.
Sedative or analgesic drugs were administered in approx­
imately half of the study cases. Dutch neonatologists 
consider relieving discomfort in the dying process, even if 
this may hasten death, as a good clinical practice.
Levin10 has described the large variations in decision 
making that occur in neonatal intensive care units in differ­
ent nations. These variations are based on differences in (1) 
the availability of resources, (2) social attitudes toward 
medical interventions and toward life with disabilities, (3) 
the role of physicians, parents, and other decision makers, 
and (4) legal considerations. Levin stressed the value of 
comparative research. We do not know whether current 
practice in the Netherlands, as reported in our study, differs 
significantly from practice in other countries.
The American Academy of Pediatrics’ guidelines on 
foregoing life-sustaining medical treatment state that ethical 
theory and legal practice provide reasons to start or stop 
treatments, primarily on the basis of relative benefits and 
burdens for the patient.] 1 These guidelines also state that de- 
cisions for patients who lack decision-making capacities are 
made together by physicians and families and are guided by 
the “best-interest standard.”  Families must be informed 
fully and adequately without withholding any details. Ac­
cording to these guidelines, benefits relate to prolongation of 
life, quality of life, physical pleasure, emotional enjoyment, 
and intellectual satisfaction. Burdens include intractable 
pain, irremediable disability or helplessness, emotional suf­
fering, invasive or inhumane interventions designed to sus­
tain life, or other circumstances that severely compromise 
the patient’s quality of life,
Doyal et al.,12 from the United Kingdom, have proposed 
that the only acceptable legal and ethical justification for de­
viating from the general obligation to provide lifesaving care 
is that such deviation is sometimes in the patient's best in­
terests. Accordingly, selective non treatment in neonatal 
cases is acceptable (1) when a neonate will inevitably die in 
a short time regardless of which therapy is provided, (2) 
when brain damage is so severe that death would arguably 
be preferable to life, and (3) when the neonate’s burden of 
pain and suffering with treatment fails to outweigh the ben­
efits of life, even if the infant is not in a terminal state.
Although these opinions are attempts to determine normal 
grounds for foregoing life-sustaining therapies, in a personal 
retrospective view Silverman13 has stressed the moral as­
pects of (over)treatment in neonatal care. He argued that it 
is slowly but surely being realized by all concerned that un­
restrained, intensive treatment of the smallest and most se­
verely malformed babies is unreviewed and unlegislated so­
cial policy. He has underscored the significance of the par­
ents’ role in these decisions by stating that the right to
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personhood granted by law to a newborn infant is an empty 
gift. Only parents or equally committed surrogates can make 
this gift meaningful.
In a recent review, Pearson et al.14 studied decision-mak­
ing about “ futile” treatment in neonatal intensive care, by 
means of an individualized approach with family meetings. 
They found that only 19% of deaths in 1991 were not pre­
ceded by a decision to limit or withdraw care. Our study 
yields the same results—35 category 1 deaths in a total of 
181 deaths.
We are convinced that neonatal intensive care is valuable 
and ethically justifiable. Many infants who formerly would 
have had no chance of survival now may be kept alive with 
a good outcome. We expect that neonatal intensive care will 
develop further and reach new milestones. The neonatal 
mortality rate most likely will continue to decrease. How­
ever, we are also convinced that neonatal intensive care 
should be applied with discretion. The burden of care must 
be congruent with its goals, which relate to more than patient 
survival. Thus withholding or withdrawing care from infants 
with extremely poor prognoses should be permitted. This 
possibility should apply to infants without any chance of 
survival and for infants with a small chance of survival but 
whose quality of life would be extremely poor.
The process of foregoing treatment must be meticulous 
and carefully circumscribed, because there is no means of 
reversal of the result. The decision to forego treatment should 
be made only on the basis of agreement between fully 
informed parents and the attending physician, with the sup­
port of medical colleagues, nurses, and other professionals.
In the Netherlands, discussions of end-of-life decision 
making in neonatal intensive care are held in the context of 
the wider societal discussions about euthanasia and assisted 
suicide. We believe that neonatal cases do overlap to a de­
gree with the decision making under review in the euthana­
sia discussions. We recognize that intentional and active ter­
mination of a neonate’s life has its adult image in “ involun­
tary euthanasia/ ’ However, neonatal cases involving end- 
of-life decisions are different in essential respects from 
euthanasia cases. As yet there is no thorough legal or ethical 
analysis about such neonatal cases.
We have found that intentional and active termination of 
a neonate’s life rarely occurs in neonatal intensive care units 
in the Netherlands. Withholding or withdrawing intensive 
therapy in view of the neonate’s expected quality of life does
occur more often. Such a decision places great responsibil­
ity on the doctor who carries out the decision. As argued in 
“Doen of Laten?” 7 we propose that responsibility of at least 
equal weight lies with the decision to introduce and/or sus­
tain such aggressive therapy. Dutch neonatologists are now 
being pressured to prove that foregoing treatment in cases 
involving extremely poor prognoses is preferable to con­
tinuing treatment. An ethical and legal framework is needed 
in which patients benefit maximally from modern technol­
ogy without becoming victims of pointless short-term or 
long-term suffering,
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